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I. INTRODUCTION
Prior to 1995, the tobacco industry was an impenetrable fortress. The industry
admitted nothing, denied everything, and successfully defended nearly every lawsuit
filed against it.2 Then, in 1995, a war was waged against the tobacco industry by
both the federal and state governments. The war began on the federal level with
President Clinton’s approval of federal legislation that declared nicotine an addictive
drug and authorized the Federal Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to seek
jurisdiction over tobacco products as “drug delivery devices.”3 Additionally, the
President announced broad executive action which sharply restricted the advertising,
promotion, distribution and marketing of tobacco products with the goal of
protecting children and adolescents from the dangers of tobacco products.4
Following President Clinton’s lead, U.S. Attorneys General from 46 states5
joined forces to file a single lawsuit that has made the participating tobacco
companies6 willing to settle to terms that will change the tobacco industry forever.7
This settlement is known as the Master Settlement Agreement. For example, banned
are advertisements on billboards, in sports arenas and stadiums, shopping malls,
buses and trains. Sales of T-shirts, caps and other merchandise are banned, as well

2
Betty D. Montgomery, Montgomery Announces Tobacco Settlement–Ohio Will Receive
Hundreds
of
Millions
Per
Year
(last
modified
Nov.
18,
1999)
<http://www.ag.state.oh.US/pressrel/tobanni.htm>
3

President’s News Conference, 31 WKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1415 (August 10, 1995).

4

FDA Regulations, 60 Fed. Reg. at 41,453

5

Betty D. Montgomery, Master Settlement Agreement (visited Jan. 8, 1999)
<http://www.ag.state.oh.US/pressrel/tobanni.htm> The Attorney Generals involved in the
Master Settlement Agreement are from: Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California,
Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas,
Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Missouri, Montana,
Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina,
North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South
Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and
Wyoming. Officials from the following were also involved: American Samoa, District of
Columbia, Guam, Northern Mariana Islands, Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, and the Virgin
Islands of the United States.
6

Montgomery, supra note 5, at 2. The 1998 Master Settlement Agreement participating
companies are Philip Morris Inc., R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company, Brown and Williamson
Tobacco Corp., and Lorillard Tobacco Company.
7

Clint O’Connor, So Long, Marlboro Man: Tobacco Settlement Means End of Cigarette
Billboards, CLEVELAND PLAIN DEALER, March 7, 1999, at K-1. The Master Settlement
Agreement reached in November of 1998 calls for $206 billion to be paid to the participating
states over the next 25 years. Id.

1999-2000]THE TOBACCO INDUSTRY AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT

299

as promotion of tobacco products in movies, TV shows, theater productions, music
performances, videos and video games.8
Because a number of the terms contained in the Master Settlement Agreement
have sharply restricted the tobacco industry’s ability to market and advertise its
products, the settlement agreement has First Amendment commercial speech
implications. Should challenges to the Master Settlement Agreement arise, the
Supreme Court would employ the pathbreaking decision for determining when the
government may restrict commercial speech, Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp.
v. Public Service Commission of New York9 and its progeny to assess its
constitutionality.10
This Note discusses and assesses the Government’s likelihood of passing
constitutional scrutiny with the Master Settlement Agreement’s restrictions in light
of the First Amendment case law. A majority of the restrictions will likely pass
constitutional scrutiny because they meet the demanding requirements of Central
Hudson and its progeny. The author believes that a few of the restrictions need to be
more narrowly tailored in order to pass constitutional scrutiny. Suggestions on how
to narrowly tailor the restrictions to comport with Central Hudson are proffered by
the author.
Section II provides an overview of the history of First Amendment commercial
speech jurisprudence. It discusses cases that foreshadowed the Central Hudson
decision, the Central Hudson decision itself, the progeny of Central Hudson which
has slightly refined the original four prong test for commercial speech, and addresses
the possible trends in light of the progeny. Section III of the note addresses why the
Master Settlement Agreement may have problems passing constitutional scrutiny and
what parties may have standing to challenge the provisions. Section IV gives an indepth look into how the restrictions will fare when analyzed under the Central
Hudson four prong test, and individually assesses selected restrictions. Finally,
Section V makes suggestions on how the government can cure the restrictions that
may be found constitutionally infirm.
II. THE COMMERCIAL SPEECH DOCTRINE
A. The Supreme Court’s Traditional View on Commercial Speech
In the early days of the commercial speech doctrine, the Supreme Court afforded
no protection to “expression related solely to the economic interests of the speaker
and its audience.”11 The Court stressed the “traditional view” that communications
to which First Amendment protection would be given were not of a purely
commercial nature.12 The Supreme Court, however, rejected the traditional view that
commercial speech was not subject to First Amendment protection when it decided

8

Id.

9

Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm’n of New York, 447 U.S. 557
(1980).
10

Montgomery, supra note 5, at 2.

11

Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 561.

12

New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 266 (1964).
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Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizen’s Consumer Council, Inc.13
The Court held that speech that proposes no more than a commercial transaction can
be protected under First Amendment law.14 The Court refused to accept the State’s
paternalistic approach, forbidding it from completely suppressing the dissemination
of concededly truthful information about entirely lawful activity because it was
fearful of the information’s effect upon its disseminators and its recipients.15 The
Court acknowledged that society has a strong interest in “the free flow of
commercial information”, including the “proper allocation of resources in a free
enterprise system”.16 Therefore, the First Amendment can protect commercial
speech from unwarranted governmental intrusion.17
B. Central Hudson’s Four-Prong Standard for Analyzing Commercial Speech
After deciding Virginia Pharmacy, the Supreme Court determined Central
Hudson,18 thereby laying down a four-part test for determining whether a given
regulation of commercial speech violates the First Amendment. The government is
permitted to regulate commercial speech if the following four conditions are met: (1)
the speech qualifies for protection in that it is neither misleading nor concerns an
unlawful activity; (2) the asserted governmental interest in support of the restriction
is substantial; (3) the restriction directly advances the interest; and (4) the regulation
is not “more extensive than is necessary to serve that interest.” 19 The third and
fourth prongs of the Central Hudson test require consideration of the fit between the
government’s substantial interest and the means chosen to accomplish that
objective.20 These elements of the test have proven to be the most difficult to satisfy.
Applying the test to the facts of Central Hudson, the Court held that the utilities’
promotional advertising was speech protected by the First Amendment. The State
had two interests that the Court found to be substantial, conservation of energy and
maintenance of a fair and efficient rate structure. Although, the Court found that
there was a direct link between the ban and the substantial interest of energy
conservation, the ban on energy conservation was more extensive than needed to
further the state’s interest and, therefore, the State failed to satisfy the fourth prong
of Central Hudson.21
13
Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizen’s Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S.
748 (1976).
14

Id. at 762.

15

Id. at 773.

16

Id. at 765.

17

Id. at 761-62.

18

Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566 (1980).

19

Id. at 566. For purposes of First Amendment analysis, examples of government interests
that might qualify as “substantial” include preserving the reputation of professions, Florida
Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618 (1995); protecting the health, safety and welfare of
citizens, Rubin v. Coors, 514 U.S. 476 (1995); and protecting the physical and psychological
well-being of children, New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982).
20

United States v. Edge Broadcasting, Co., 509 U.S. 418 (1993).

21

Id. at 431.
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C. Modifications to the Central Hudson Four-Prong Standard
In Edenfield v. Fans,22 the Supreme Court struck down a state ban against
solicitation by certified public accountants (CPA’s) for failure to satisfy the third
prong of Central Hudson. The State of Florida imposed a blanket ban on direct, inperson, uninvited solicitation by CPA’s who sought to communicate truthful nondeceptive information proposing a lawful commercial transaction.23 The Court stated
that the government identified certain interests in regulating solicitation in the
accounting profession that are important and within its legitimate power, but that the
government failed to provide substantial evidence to show that the regulation directly
and materially advanced the state’s purported interest.24 Most importantly in
Edenfield, the Court watered down the “not more extensive than is necessary” fourth
prong of Central Hudson. Thus, the current requirement to satisfy the fourth prong
“means–end fit” is that the means be “tailored in a reasonable manner” to serve the
government objective.25 In other words, some looseness in the means-end fit will be
tolerated where what is regulated is commercial speech.26
Another important case in First Amendment commercial speech jurisprudence
was Posadas de Puerto Rico Associates v. Tourism Company of Puerto Rico.27 In
Posadas, the Court held that the government could ban advertising for casino
gambling aimed at Puerto Rican residents because the commercial speech at issue
concerned a lawful activity and was not misleading or fraudulent.28 Posadas was
significant because the Court’s opinion stood for the idea that if an activity could be
completely banned, advertising of the activity could be completely banned, or tightly
regulated.29 This holding gave state legislatures greater power to regulate the
advertising of products that are lawful, but believed by the legislature to be harmful.
Examples of such “vice” products are cigarettes, liquor, and gambling.

22

Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761 (1993).

23

Id. at 763-64.

24

Id. at 771.

25

Id. at 767.

26

Id. at 769. The fact that there may be some other means that would serve the
government interest as well, while restricting the commercial speech less, will not be fatal.
Some degree of looseness in the means-end fit will be tolerated when what is being regulated
is commercial speech. Board of Trustees of SUNY v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 480 (1989).
27

Posadas de Puerto Rico Associates v. Tourism Co. of Puerto Rico, 478 U.S. 328 (1986).

28

Id. at 340-41.

29

Id. at 345-46. The majority stated in Posadas that “the greater power to completely ban
casino gambling necessarily includes the lesser power to ban advertising of casino gambling.”
Id. This is also known in First Amendment jurisprudence as the “greater includes the lesser”
theory. The theory posits that if a state can completely ban a particular product, it could
instead choose to ban or tightly regulate advertising for that product because this would be a
lesser intrusion. Id.
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This theory, however, was rejected in 44 Liquormart v. Rhode Island30 by a
number of Justices of the Supreme Court because “it is quite clear that banning
speech may sometimes prove far more intrusive than banning conduct. . . .”31 “[A]
state legislature does not have the broad discretion to suppress truthful,
nonmisleading information for paternalistic purposes.”32 In 44 Liquormart, the
Court indicated a willingness to apply a more stringent standard of review to
government restrictions of commercial speech. The Court unanimously struck down
a Rhode Island statute that provided for a blanket ban on all retail price advertising
for alcoholic beverages on the ground that the state failed to establish a “reasonable
fit” between the restriction and the stated goal of reducing alcohol consumption.33
Specifically, the Court reasoned (1) that the state offered insufficient proof that the
restriction would advance its interest, and (2) that alternative forms of regulation
were available to the state to achieve its goals that would not involve a restriction of
speech.34 However, the Court refused to engage in “speculation or conjecture,”
finding it an unacceptable means of demonstrating that a restriction on commercial
speech directly advances the State’s asserted interest.35 Following 44 Liquormart, it
became clear that the majority of the Court intends to review stringently government
regulation of accurate commercial speech regarding a lawful activity.
D. Recent Trends in First Amendment Law in Light of 44 Liquormart
Two recent commercial speech cases decided by the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit provide some insight into how restrictions on
commercial advertising might be handled in light of 44 Liquormart. Both Penn
Advertising v. Baltimore36 and Anheuser-Busch v. Schmoke37 addressed Baltimore
city ordinances covering commercial speech. Penn Advertising involved an
ordinance prohibiting cigarette advertising on billboards located in designated areas
of the city38 and Anheuser-Busch39 involved a similar ordinance prohibiting outdoor
30

517 U.S. 484 (1996).
Posadas clearly erred in concluding that it was “up to the legislature” to choose
suppression over a less speech-restrictive policy. The Posada’s majority’s conclusion
on that point cannot be reconciled with the unbroken line of prior cases striking down
similarly broad regulations on truthful, nonmisleading advertising when non-speechrelated alternatives were available. Id. at 509-10.
31

Id. at 511. Only three other Justices joined directly with Stevens in rejecting Posadas,
but at least four, if not all five, of the remaining members seemed to agree that the reasoning
in Posadas should no longer be followed. Id.
32

Id. at 510.

33

Id. at 505-06.

34

Id.

35

44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 507.

36

Penn Adver. v. Baltimore, 63 F.3d 1318 (4th Cir. 1995), vacated, 116 S. Ct. 2575
(1996), on remand, 101 F.3d 332 (4th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1569 (1997).
37

Anheuser-Busch v. Schmoke, 63 F.3d 1305 (4th Cir. 1995), vacated, 116 S. Ct. 1821
(1996), on remand, 101 F.3d 332 (4th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1569 (1997).
38

Id. at 1321.
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advertising of alcoholic beverages. Both ordinances included an exception for
permitting outdoor advertising in certain commercially and industrially zoned areas
of the city.40 Applying the Central Hudson test in Anheuser, the United States Court
of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit upheld the restriction on the advertising of
alcoholic beverages and determined that the ordinance directly and materially
advanced the city’s interest in promoting the welfare and temperance of minors41 and
that the relationship between the restriction and the purported government objective
“falls well within the range tolerated by the First Amendment”42 for the regulation of
commercial speech. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
reasoned that because adults could still receive advertising messages and information
through other media, and commercial and industrial zones were exempted from the
billboard ban, the ordinance was not more extensive than necessary to serve the
governmental interest.43 Similarly, in Penn Advertising, the Court of Appeals held
that the asserted public interest in preventing the purchase and consumption of
cigarettes by minors was directly advanced by the billboard restrictions and that the
advertising regulation was narrowly tailored to comply with the First Amendment.44
Penn Advertising and Anheuser-Busch, decided prior to 44 Liquormart, were
vacated and remanded by the Supreme Court for reconsideration in light of that
decision. On remand, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed its decision,
holding that the ordinances were constitutional time, place, and manner restrictions,
not a blanket ban like that in 44 Liquormart.45 The Supreme Court denied certiorari
in both cases.46
Another recent case, Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union,47 addressed the
constitutionality of the Communications Decency Act (“CDA”), a federal law aimed
at protecting minors from indecent materials transmitted over the Internet. The
Supreme Court found the CDA to be unconstitutional because “in order to deny
minors access to potentially harmful speech, the CDA effectively suppresses a large
amount of speech that adults have a constitutional right to receive and to address to
one another.”48 The Court held that the CDA’s burden on adult speech was
unacceptable because it was possible that “less restrictive alternatives would be at
least effective in achieving the legitimate purpose that the statute was enacted to

39

Id. at 1309.

40

Penn Adver., 63 F.3d at 1321; Anheuser-Busch, 63 F.3d at 1309.

41

Id.

42

Id. at 1317.

43

Id.

44

Penn Adver., 63 F.3d at 1325-26.

45

44 Liquormart, 101 F.3d at 330.

46

See Penn Adver., 117 S. Ct. 1569 (1997); See Anheuser-Busch, 117 S. Ct. 1569 (1997).

47

Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997).

48

Id. at 2346.
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serve.”49 The government failed to explain why less restrictive alternatives would
not be as effective as the CDA, therefore the law was struck down.50
III. EVALUATING THE MASTER SETTLEMENT UNDER CENTRAL HUDSON
A. Constitutional or Unconstitutional?
In order to accurately assess the constitutionality of the Master Settlement
Agreement’s marketing and advertising restrictions, one must keep in mind the
Government’s substantial, if not compelling, interest in preventing and reducing
youth smoking. Most restrictions on marketing and advertising contained in the
Master Settlement Agreement will be upheld as being constitutional because the
Government will be able to demonstrate that it has complied with Central Hudson’s
four-prong test, thus permitting the Government to constitutionally restrict the
tobacco companies commercial speech.51 The constitutionality of the restrictions is
further supported by the fact that even though smoking is a lawful activity for adults
to engage in, the purchase and consumption of tobacco products by minors is
unlawful.52 Even if the tobacco companies are able to demonstrate that the
advertising and marketing of their products is lawful and nonmisleading in order to
qualify for some level of First Amendment protection, narrowly tailored restrictions
on such advertising and marketing designed to protect minors may be both justified
and constitutional.53
B. Who is Empowered to Challenge?
Before assessing the constitutionality of the restrictions on marketing and
advertising contained in the Master Settlement Agreement, a reviewing court must
first determine if the party or parties bringing suit have proper standing to appear
before the court.54 Pursuant to the Master Settlement Agreement, the participating
tobacco companies have agreed to waive their right to constitutionally challenge the
provisions of the Master Settlement Agreement.55 Courts have upheld the voluntary
waiver of constitutional rights, including the right to free speech protected by the
First Amendment, that was obtained through a settlement agreement.56 However,

49

Id.

50

Id. at 2348.

51

See Hogan & Hartson, supra note 1.

52

Id.

53

Id.

54

ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION § 2.3.1 (2d ed. 1994). “Standing is the
determination of whether a specific person is the proper party to bring a particular matter to a
federal court for adjudication.” Id. The Supreme Court has declared that “[i]n essence the
question of standing is whether the litigant is entitled to have the court decide the merits of the
dispute or of particular issues.” Id. (Chemerinsky quoting the U.S. Supreme Court in Warth
v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975).
55

See Montgomery, supra note 5 at XV. Voluntary Act Of The Parties.

56

Wilkicki v. Brady, 882 F. Supp. 1227, 1232-38 (D.R.I. 1995).
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this will not be enough to insulate the Master Settlement Agreement from
constitutional challenges by other parties that have an interest in the lawsuit.
Even though participating tobacco companies may not constitutionally challenge
the Master Settlement Agreement, there are several other possible parties that may
attain standing to challenge the restrictions as unconstitutional infringements on their
First Amendment rights. The Master Settlement Agreement does not specifically
state that the settlement provisions apply to the non-participating tobacco companies,
making it highly likely that these companies will seek standing to obtain a favorable
ruling on the settlement’s restrictions.57 Also, new tobacco companies that were not
party to the contractual agreement may also seek standing to challenge the
restrictions.58 Additionally, consumers may challenge the settlement provisions as
an infringement of their right to receive information on tobacco products.59
Furthermore, billboard advertising and media companies may also gain standing to
challenge the restrictions.60 It is likely that some party will have standing to
challenge the restrictions on marketing and advertising contained in the Master
Settlement Agreement.61
C. Assessing the Government’s Ability to Constitutionally Restrict Commercial
Speech under Central Hudson
1. Does the Speech Qualify for Constitutional Protection?
The constitutional inquiry of Central Hudson begins with determining whether
the commercial speech qualifies for constitutional protection. Commercial speech
which is misleading or deceptive, or which proposes an illegal transaction is not
entitled to First Amendment protection.62 Although the use of tobacco products by
adults is not illegal, the advertising and marketing directed at use and consumption
by minors does relate to unlawful conduct.63 The sale of tobacco products to minors
is unlawful in all 50 states, and a majority of those states prohibit the purchase,
possession or use of tobacco by minors.64 This is the argument that the FDA has
forwarded to implement restrictions on the tobacco companies rights to advertise. A
number of the FDA’s restrictions have been incorporated into the Master Settlement
Agreement.65 “Thus, to the extent that tobacco advertising is aimed at children and

57

See Hogan & Hartson, supra note 1.

58

Id.

59

Virginia State Bd. of Pharm. v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. at

757.
60

Penn Adver., 63 F.3d 1318 (4th Cir. 1995).

61

See Hogan & Hartson, supra note 1.

62

Virginia Bd. of Pharm., 425 U.S. at 762.

63

See Hogan & Hartson, supra note 1.

64

Id.

65

FDA Regulations, 61 Fed. Reg. at 44,471.
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adolescents, or at least at contemplating under age use, the FDA argues that its
restrictions on advertising and promotion of tobacco products are constitutional.”66
Despite the efforts of the FDA to have tobacco advertisements categorized as
“relating to an unlawful activity” and “inherently misleading” thereby falling out
from under the umbrella of First Amendment protection, the Supreme Court is likely
to determine that tobacco advertisements are entitled to constitutional protection
because they reach adults in addition to minors. “Established First Amendment
doctrine makes clear, however, government may not reduce adults to the status of
children, by regulating expression directed primarily at adults on the grounds that
minors may be exposed to it.”67 “The level of discourse reaching a mailbox simply
cannot be limited to that which would be suitable for a sandbox.”68
It has also been argued that tobacco advertisements are inherently misleading
because no advertisement gives adequate warning of the wide range of serious and
life threatening diseases that may be caused by ordinary use of the tobacco
products.69 This argument is likely to fail because “unlike advertising for virtually
any other lawful product, tobacco advertising is already required by government to
place a variety of explicit warnings concerning the dangers of smoking.”70 Adults
are completely capable of reading the warnings on labels and counter-balancing the
pleasures of engaging in the activity with the dangers.71 The Court is likely to
dismiss the “inherently misleading” argument because it has already ruled in
Virginia State Board of Pharmacy72 that the government may not restrict speech for
paternalistic reasons.
Since tobacco companies have a lawful interest in advertising their products to
adults, and provided that the advertisements are found truthful and nonmisleading,
the Court is likely to find the advertisements entitled to First Amendment
protection.73 The Government’s restrictions must also survive the next three prongs
of Central Hudson to pass constitutional scrutiny.
2. Is The Government’s Interest Substantial?
Assuming that Prong 1 of Central Hudson is satisfied and that the commercial
speech qualifies for at least some protection, the government must now forward a
substantial interest to justify the restrictions contained in the Master Settlement
Agreement. One of the main objectives of the settlement is to reduce children’s use
of tobacco products74 which has been labeled a “health epidemic problem.”75 The
66

Id.

67

Martin H. Redish, Tobacco Advertising and the First Amendment, 81 IOWA L. REV. 589,
608 (1996).
68

Reno, 521 U.S. at 875 (citing Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 74-75
(1983)).
69

Redish, supra note 67.

70

Id. at 609. The warnings appear at 15 U.S.C. § 1333.

71

Id.

72

Virginia State Board of Pharm., 425 U.S. at 773.

73

Hogan & Hartson, supra note 1.

74

Montgomery, supra note 2.
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Supreme Court is likely to find the government’s interest in protecting the nation’s
youth from the harms of tobacco use a substantial, if not compelling interest, because
the Court has repeatedly recognized that the protection of children deserves special
solicitude when considering a restriction that implicates the First Amendment.76 The
government should not have difficulty meeting the second prong of Central Hudson.
3. Do The Restrictions Advance The Government’s Interest “To A Material
Degree”?
When Central Hudson was originally decided, the third prong required that the
regulation of commercial speech be “no more extensive than necessary” to achieve
the government’s objective.77 But Central Hudson’s progeny has relaxed the meansend fit, requiring that the means be “designed in a reasonable way” to serve the
government objective (i.e. that the means advance the objective in a “direct and
material way.”)78 The fact that there may be some other means that may serve the
government interest as well, while restricting the speech less, will not necessarily be
fatal. Some degree of looseness in the means-end fit will be tolerated when
commercial speech is being regulated.79
Satisfaction of this prong may pose some difficulty for the government to satisfy
because “the quantity and quality of evidence that the courts should require in order
to uphold a restriction on commercial speech is unsettled and reflects disagreement
among Supreme Court justices.”80 In Florida Bar v.Went For It, Inc.,81 a survey
prepared by the state bar association was sufficient to support a ban on targeted
direct-mail solicitation by attorneys, despite certain methodological shortcomings.
The dissent insisted that the bar association should have conducted the survey in
accordance with basic standards of social science research. In Burson v. Freeman,82
the Court declared that some decisions are justified based on “simple common
sense.” However, most recently in 44 Liquormart,83 Justice Stevens asserted that
“anecdotal evidence and educated guesses” are insufficient to satisfy the
government’s burden to show that the ban on price advertising would “materially”
reduce alcohol consumption.
In light of the more stringent evidence that 44 Liquormart’s holding seems to
require, it is important that the Attorneys General maintain that their goal is to reduce
children’s use of tobacco products. They must run the same offensive as the FDA,
that cigarette advertising is directed at youth, who could not be legal buyer’s of the
75

Office on Health and Smoking, U.S. Dep’t. of Health and Human Servs., Preventing
Tobacco Use Among Young People: A Report of the Surgeon General (1994) at foreword.
76
New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982) (protecting the physical and psychological
well-being of children represents a compelling state interest).
77

Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 572.

78

Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 769 (1993).

79

Board of Trustees of SUNY v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 480 (1989).

80

Hogan & Hartson, supra note 1.

81

515 U.S. at 618.

82

Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 211 (1992).

83

517 U.S. at 505.
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product and should therefore be restricted. The other alternative, the “discourage
consumption” objective which portrays that tobacco is bad and that less advertising
will mean less consumption, was disfavored in 44 Liquormart.84 In that case, the
government presented no findings of fact, or any evidentiary support whatsoever to
suggest that its speech prohibition [would] significantly reduce market-wide
consumption.85 The Court refused to engage in such “speculation or conjecture”
which is an unacceptable means of demonstrating that a restriction on commercial
speech directly advances the government’s asserted interest.86 The safer argument
for the Attorneys General to make is that the restrictions will directly and materially
reduce the use of tobacco products by children because there are findings to support
such a substantial interest.
The third prong of Central Hudson requires the government to demonstrate that
the restrictions contained in the Master Settlement Agreement “directly and
materially advance”87 the substantial governmental interest in reducing children’s use
of tobacco products. “To meet this burden, the government must show that tobacco
advertising ‘plays a concrete role in the decision of minors to smoke’ and that the
restrictions will ultimately contribute to protecting the health of children.”88 The
government can demonstrate that the means-end fit is tailored in a reasonable
manner by providing evidence and findings of fact that demonstrate that there is an
association between tobacco advertising and underage smoking.89 There is a
substantial amount of evidence, both direct and indirect, that supports this link.
Many different well-respected institutions, including the American Medical
Association,90 have conducted thorough studies, in accordance with basic standards
of social science research, that affirmatively link tobacco advertising with youth
smoking. These studies have found that nearly 3,000 Americans start smoking every
day, and most of these new smokers are children or adolescents.91 Studies also show
that over ninety percent of those who become long-term smokers begin smoking as
children or adolescents.92 A person who does not start smoking as a minor is
unlikely to become a smoker later on in life.93 It is no secret that children are aware
84

Id. at 506.

85

Id. (citing Edenfield, 507 U.S. at 770).

86

Id. at 507.
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Edenfield, 507 U.S. at 771.
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Hogan & Hartson, supra note 1 (quoting FDA Regulations, 61 Fed. Reg. at 44, 474).
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Id.
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Joseph R. DiFranza et al., RJR Nabisco’s Cartoon Camel Promotes Camel Cigarettes to
Children, 266 J. AM. MED. ASSOC. 3149-50 (1991). A recent study published by the American
Medical Association demonstrated that more pre-school age children can match Joe Camel to
cigarettes than Mickey Mouse to Walt Disney.
91

Ronald M. Davis, Reducing Youth Access To Tobacco, 266 J. AM. MED. ASSOC. 3186
(1991).
92
Health-Care Provider Advice on Tobacco Use To Persons Aged 10-22 Years, 44
MORBIDITY AND MORTALITY WEEKLY REP. 826 (1995).
93
Peter Rheinstein & Thomas McGinnis, Children and Tobacco: The Clinton
Administration Proposal, 52 AM FAMILY PHYSICIAN 1205 (1995).
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of, respond favorably to, and are influenced by cigarette advertising.94 The evidence
demonstrates that a strong correlation exists between tobacco advertising and
consumption by minors.95
In addition, the government must continue to develop the record that concretely
establishes findings of fact and evidence that links tobacco advertising directly with
underage tobacco product usage. The government will then be prepared to
demonstrate to a court that the regulation’s means-end fit is “tailored in a reasonable
manner” to accomplish the government’s substantial interest.96 Development of the
record is essential in demonstrating compliance with 44 Liquormart’s recent scrutiny
of the nexus between speech restrictions and the advancement of the government
interest.97
4. Is There A Reasonable Fit Between The State’s Regulation And The Stated
Interest?
The fourth prong of the Central Hudson test requires the court to examine
whether a “reasonable fit” exists between the limitations placed on commercial
speech and the government’s substantial interest.98 The restrictions on speech must
not be “more extensive than necessary”.99 This test requires a “fit that is not
necessarily perfect, but reasonable; that represents not necessarily the single best
disposition but one whose scope is in proportion to the interest served.”100 The
government need not employ the “the least restrictive means to accomplish its goal,
the fit between the means and ends must be ‘narrowly tailored’.”101
When the Court applied this standard in 44 Liquormart, it concluded that the
government could have used other, less restrictive, non-speech means to “promote
temperance” than banning price advertisements. For example, the government could
have accomplished its objective by establishing a minimum price, raising the sales
tax, instituting educational campaigns, or placing per capita limits on purchases.102
The Court struck down the outright ban on advertising because it interfered with
the core informational function of commercial speech, the advertising of “who is

94

Federal Regulations, 61 Fed. Reg. at 44, 475.

95

Id. at 44,474, 44,488.

96

Board of Trustees of State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 480 (1989).

97

Hogan & Hartson, supra note 1.
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Edenfield, 507 U.S. at 769.

99

44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 528-29. (O’Connor, J., plurality opinion) When Central
Hudson was first decided, the fourth prong required that the regulation be “not more extensive
than necessary” to serve the government interest. However, several post-Central Hudson
cases show that the Court has watered down the “not more extensive than necessary” to “least
restrictive means to accomplish its goal”. Today, all that is required of the means-end fit is
that the regulation be “narrowly tailored” to serve the governmental interest.
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Id. (citing Board of Trustees of State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. at 480).
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See Hogan & Hartson, supra note 1 (quoting 44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 528).
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producing and selling what product, for what reason, and at what price.”103 The
majority of the restrictions contained in the Master Settlement Agreement are
distinguishable from the outright ban the Court struck down in 44 Liquormart. The
Master Settlement Agreement adopts narrowly tailored restrictions that will serve the
government’s asserted interest. The narrowly tailored restrictions have virtually no
effect on the tobacco companies’ ability to advertise the core informational
commercial speech.
In applying the fourth prong of Central Hudson to determine if the restrictions
are narrowly tailored enough in relation to the reduction of tobacco consumption by
minors, it is important for the government to demonstrate to the courts that less
restrictive alternatives than banning speech have already been employed and found
lacking. State governments have enacted laws that banned the sale of cigarettes to
minors, and employed “stings” and identification checks in order to reduce underage
smoking.104 These non-speech, least restrictive alternatives have not shown much
progress in reducing underage smoking; therefore, restrictions on speech are justified
as a last resort.105 The Master Settlement Agreement incorporates numerous nonspeech-restrictive options106 in addition to commercial speech provisions in hopes
that a comprehensive scheme will achieve the government’s stated purpose of
reducing underage tobacco use. This multifaceted approach to reducing youth
tobacco use will be helpful when a court analyzes the fit between the particular
speech restrictions and the goals of the legislation.”107
D. The Master Settlement Agreement’s Marketing and Advertising Restrictions
The 1998 Master Settlement Agreement contains a number of marketing and
advertising restrictions. For purposes of this Note, the author has chosen to discuss
the following eight marketing and advertising restrictions contained in the 1998
Master Settlement Agreement that directly implicate First Amendment commercial
speech rights.108
• A requirement that tobacco product advertising be limited to black text on
white
background except for advertising in adult-only facilities and in “adult
publications”109;110
103

44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 496.

104

See Hogan & Hartson, supra note 1, at 15.

105

Id.

106
Id. at 16. Some of the non-speech-restrictive provisions include licensure of retail
tobacco product sellers, restrictions on access to tobacco products, and the “look back”
provisions. “Look back” provisions set specific targets for the reduction in current levels of
underage smoking and use of smokeless products over the next ten years. Id.
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Hogan & Hartson, supra note 1, at *16.

108

See Montgomery, supra note 5 at III. Permanent Relief. The listed restrictions in this
article are in no way exhaustive of all the restrictions contained in the 1998 Master Settlement
Agreement. See id. at III. Permanent relief, (a)-(r).
109
FDA Format and Content Requirements for Labeling and Advertising of Cigarettes and
Smokeless Tobacco, 21 C.F.R. § 897.32(a)(2) (1996). As defined in the FDA’s 1996 rule’s,
“adult-only publications” are defined as those: (1) whose readers that are 18 or older
constitute 85 percent or more of the publication’s total readership, or (2) that are read by two
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• A ban on sponsorships, including sponsorship of concerts and sporting events,
in the name, logo or selling message of a tobacco brand;111
• A ban on all non-tobacco merchandise, including caps, jackets and bags,
bearing the name, logo or selling message of a tobacco brand;112
• A ban on all outdoor advertising of tobacco products as well as a ban on
advertising indoors when the advertising is directed outside;113
• A ban on the use of human images and cartoon characters in tobacco
advertising (e.g. Joe Camel and the Marlboro Man)114;115
• A ban on all tobacco product advertising on the Internet that is accessible from
the U.S.;116
• A ban on direct and indirect payments for tobacco images in movies, television
programs and video games;117
• A prohibition on youth targeting in the advertising, promotion or marketing of
tobacco products.118
E. Application of Central Hudson to Individual Restrictions of the Master Settlement
Agreement to Determine The Likelihood of Passing Constitutional Scrutiny
It has been demonstrated that under the first prong of Central Hudson, the
tobacco advertisements will likely be granted First Amendment protection provided
that the advertisements are found to be truthful and nonmisleading, because the
tobacco companies have a lawful interest in advertising their products to adults. It
has also been demonstrated that the Court will likely find that the government has a
substantial interest in reducing children’s use of tobacco products. Therefore, this
article now focuses on evaluating each individual restriction’s ability to pass the
third and fourth prongs of Central Hudson. If a restriction is able to pass these
prongs, it is likely to pass constitutional scrutiny by the courts and be upheld. If a
million or fewer people under age 18. Based on current readership estimates, publications
such as Rolling Stone and Sports Illustrated would be limited to text-only advertisements,
whereas Time and Newsweek would not be subject to the restriction. FDA Regulations, 61
Fed. Reg. at 44, 514 (1996).
110

See Montgomery, supra note 5 at III. Permanent Relief (c).
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Id. at (d).
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See O’Connor, supra note 7, at K-1.
[D]avid McLean, an actor that played the Marlboro Man in TV commercials, died of
lung cancer in 1995. His widow sued Philip Morris and eight other tobacco
companies for wrongful death. The suit claimed that McLean was sometimes required
to smoke five packs of Marlboro’s per photo session to ‘get the ashes to fall a certain
way, the smoke to rise a certain way and the hand to hold the cigarette in a certain
way.’ The case is still pending.”
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See Montgomery, supra note 5 at III. Permanent Relief (b).
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restriction fails these prongs, the government may need to reconsider the restriction
in light of Central Hudson and its progeny and tailor the regulation appropriately.
1. Requirement that Tobacco Product Advertising Be Limited to Black Text on a
White Background Except for Advertising in Adult-Only Facilities and Adult
Publications
The restriction requiring that tobacco product advertising be limited to black text
on a white background except in adult-only facilities and publications is likely to be
upheld as constitutional because it is narrowly tailored to limit children from
exposure to tobacco advertisements. These restrictions are designed specifically to
limit children’s exposure to commercial messages relating to a product that is
unlawful for them to purchase. Additionally, these restrictions in no way interfere
with the tobacco companies ability to advertise core information about their products
to adults as described in 44 Liquormart.119 This restriction carves out least restrictive
exceptions that only allow an adult’s right to receive product information to be
abridged if a certain percentage of the readership is adolescent. This restriction will
likely be upheld under Central Hudson because it directly advances the
government’s interest in the least restrictive manner and therefore satisfies prongs
three and four.
2. Restriction on Sponsorships, Including Sponsorships of Concerts and Sporting
Events in the Name, Logo, or Selling Message of a Tobacco Brand
The government may have some difficulty meeting the requirements of Central
Hudson with this restriction because it is less focused on the asserted interest. This
restriction is sweeping because its application completely extinguishes speech to
both adolescent and adult audiences.120 However, the government may be able to
craft an argument that centers around the “ubiquitous nature” of tobacco
sponsorship.121 It may be difficult, if not impossible, to construct less restrictive
alternatives that continue to adequately protect children from harmful messages.122
“[T]he limitations appear to satisfy the Reno standard, which permits the limitation
of adult speech if less restrictive alternatives would not be at least as effective in
achieving the government’s ends.”123 All that is required of the fit between the
means and end is that the means be “reasonably tailored” to serve the governmental
interest, some looseness being tolerated in the means-end fit where what is regulated
is commercial speech.124 The courts may grant the government some leeway because
the restrictions advance the government’s interest in a “direct and effective.”125 It
appears that this restriction will also be able to pass constitutional scrutiny under
Central Hudson.
119

517 U.S. at 496.
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See Hogan & Hartson, supra note 1, at *11.
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3. Restriction Banning All Non-Tobacco Merchandise, Including Caps, Jackets and
Bags, Bearing the Name, Logo or Selling Message of a Tobacco Brand
This restriction is another one of the more sweeping provisions contained in the
Master Settlement Agreement because it will completely ban all merchandise
bearing the name, logo or selling message of a tobacco brand. Again, the
“ubiquitous” nature of tobacco advertising makes the crafting of less restrictive
alternatives that will not sacrifice the government’s goal of reducing youth smoking
almost impossible.126 If this merchandise is permitted to be marketed, it will
undoubtedly end up in the hands of a child and undermine the government’s
substantial interest. The government will be able to use the nature of tobacco
advertising against the tobacco companies and substantiate with evidence that a
complete ban is the least restrictive alternative possible to obtain the government’s
objective. The Court is likely to determine that adult speech may be limited because
the Reno standard has been satisfied; in other words, less restrictive alternatives
would not be at least as effective in achieving the government’s ends.127
4. Restriction on All Outdoor Advertising of Tobacco Products As Well As A Ban
On Advertising Indoors When the Advertising is Directed Outside
This restriction on all outdoor advertising is another of the more sweeping
provisions of the Master Settlement Agreement. This means the end of all cigarette
billboards.128 The ordinances considered by the Court in Penn Advertising and
Anheuser-Busch permitted outdoor advertising in certain commercial and industrial
zones. In contrast, the restriction contained in the Master Settlement Agreement
makes no exceptions of this nature but instead eliminates all outdoor advertising of
tobacco products. Further, in 44 Liquormart, the Court stated that “if alternative
channels permit communication of the restricted speech, the regulation is more likely
to be considered reasonable.”129 The Master Settlement Agreement, on a whole,
“forecloses multiple avenues of speech, the [Master] Settlement [Agreement’s] ban
on all outdoor advertising will likely be scrutinized more carefully than similar
restrictions standing alone.”130 Some sources seem to believe that “if an adequate
factual record is developed, it may be possible to demonstrate that there are no less
restrictive alternatives that achieve a reduction in youth smoking.”131 However, it is
more likely, discerning from the trends in the aforementioned cases, that this
restriction must be more narrowly tailored to pass constitutional muster.
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See Hogan & Hartson, supra note 1, at *17.
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Id.
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See O’Connor, supra note 7. Pursuant to the Master Settlement Agreement, all
billboards must be removed by April 22, 1999. Among the brand name cigarette billboard’s
that will become extinct are Marlboro, Winston, Salem, Kool, Newport, Virginia Slims and
other brands.
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517 U.S. at 529-30. (O’Connor, J., plurality opinion) See also Anheuser-Busch, 101
F.3d at 329 (Court noted approvingly that Baltimore’s restriction did not foreclose plethora of
newspaper, magazine, radio, television, direct mail, Internet, and other media available to
Anheuser-Busch and its competitors).
130

See Hogan & Hartson, supra note 1, at *17.

131

Id. at *17. See Reno, 521 U.S. at 875.

314

JOURNAL OF LAW AND HEALTH

[Vol. 14:297

5. Restriction Banning the Use of Human Images and Cartoon Characters in
Tobacco Advertising (e.g. The Marlboro Man and Joe Camel)
This is one of the Master Settlement Agreement’s more sweeping restrictions
because it will completely extinguish speech when applied.132 The Marlboro Man
and Joe Camel will no longer be permitted to appear on billboards and in
advertisements. The government claims that the use of cartoon characters and
human images are inherently more appealing to children than they are to adults. It is
true that the Court has held that First Amendment interests may be reduced when
minors are involved.133 But, the Court has also held that speech aimed at adults may
not be restricted for fear that minors will be affected as well.134 While the
government’s interest in deterring smoking by minors is clearly a ‘substantial’one, it
is not nearly as clear that the prohibition of cartoon characters meets the final two
elements of the Central Hudson test. “In order to satisfy the elements, the
government will have to establish both that the prohibition ‘directly advances’ the
interest in deterring smoking by minors and that there exists a reasonable fit between
the means chosen and the desired ends.”135
The government needed to concretely demonstrate that a significant contributing
reason for teen smoking is the tobacco companies’ use of cartoon characters and
human images. This is where the findings of fact and evidence that the government
and FDA have collected will come into play to provide the necessary link between
cartoon characters and teen smoking, possibly allowing the government to establish
that the restriction is the least restrictive alternative. Again, the nature of tobacco
advertisement will make constructing less restrictive alternatives that protect children
from harmful messages difficult, if not impossible. The Court is likely to determine
that the Reno standard is satisfied, thus allowing the limitation of adult speech if less
restrictive alternatives would not be at least as effective in achieving the
government’s ends.136 Provided that the government keeps developing the record of
evidence to support the least restrictive alternative argument, it is likely that the
courts will find that this restriction accords with all prongs of Central Hudson.
6. Restriction On All Tobacco Advertising On The Internet That Is Accessible From
The U.S.
The Master Settlement Agreement’s restriction on advertising on the Internet
raises many constitutional questions. Internet advertising is not posted in public
places and visible to all, including children, but rather requires the user to seek out
Internet access. Also, access to Internet advertising can be regulated by the age of
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Michigan v. Butler, 352 U.S. 380, 383 (1957) (holding unconstitutional a statute
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the user.137 This restriction is equivalent to a blanket ban on commercial speech that
was struck down in 44 Liquormart. The Court has reviewed such blanket bans with
“special care mindful that speech prohibitions of this type rarely survive
constitutional review.”138 The blanket restriction on Internet advertising will affect
access to the Internet by both children and adults, therefore “censoring speech
addressed to adults in situations where it may be possible more narrowly to tailor the
restrictions to meet the objective of protecting children.”139
In Reno,140 the Court struck down the Communications Decency Act (“CDA”) as
unconstitutional because in order to deny minors access to indecent material over the
Internet, it “suppresses a large amount of speech that adults have a constitutional
right to receive and address to one another.”141 The Court held that the “the burden
on adult speech is unacceptable if less restrictive alternatives would be at least as
effective in achieving the legitimate purpose that the statute was enacted to serve.”142
Similarly, the Court will likely find this blanket restriction on Internet access
unconstitutional because less restrictive alternatives are available that will be as
effective in achieving the government’s ends. The government needs to more
narrowly tailor this restriction so that it materially advances the government’s
interest in reducing children’s use of tobacco products.
7. Restriction on Direct and Indirect Payments for Tobacco Images in Movies,
Television Programs and Video Games
Insofar as the restriction concerns advertising on television programs and video
games, the Court is likely to consider the restriction to be narrowly tailored because
of the “invasive nature of the broadcast medium and the ease with which children
can view television advertising.”143 The restriction seems to be the least restrictive
alternative available to the government to serve the interest in reducing children’s
use of tobacco products.
With respect to the restriction on advertising in movies, the restriction appears to
be tailored too broadly to achieve the government’s substantial interest. Movies
with ratings of “R” and “NC-17" are restricted to adult audiences only, therefore this
type of commercial speech regulation will not be sustained because it provides “only
ineffective or remote support for the government’s purpose.”144 The government will
have to narrowly tailor this restriction carefully in order to pass the third and fourth
prongs of Central Hudson.
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8. Restriction on Youth Targeting in the Advertising, Promotion and Marketing of
Tobacco Products
The Attorneys General have accused the tobacco industry of unconscionably
targeting youth with their use of cartoon characters and human images in the
advertising and marketing of their products.
This restriction goes to the
government’s stated substantial interest in reducing the number of youth that smoke.
The government will need to demonstrate with a vast amount of evidence that the
tobacco companies have in fact, over the years, intentionally targeted youth with
their tobacco campaigns. Provided that an accurate factual record is developed, the
government will likely be able to convince the Court that the restriction on youth
targeting directly advances the government’s interest in reducing youth smoking.
IV. CURING THE UNCONSTITUTIONAL RESTRICTIONS
Under recent Supreme Court precedent, some of the restrictions contained in the
Master Settlement Agreement may well be found to be overbroad and
unconstitutional.145 It is therefore recommended by the author that these “restrictions
be more narrowly tailored to create a closer nexus between the limitations and the
government’s interest in reducing youth smoking.”146 The government must
demonstrate to the Court that it has made an attempt at crafting the least restrictive
alternative possible and that the restriction on speech is necessary to directly and
materially advance the government’s interest in reducing youth smoking.
The government must begin by more narrowly tailoring the restriction that deals
with outdoor advertising of tobacco products. As the Court has indicated in the past,
blanket bans on commercial speech are not looked upon very fondly.147 The
government must keep in mind the facts and holdings of Penn Central Advertising
and Anheuser-Busch. The ordinances upheld in these cases were found to be
narrowly tailored because they included exceptions for outdoor advertising in certain
commercially and industrially zoned areas of the city.148 The government must allow
for such exceptions in this Master Settlement Agreement provision. Perhaps, no
outside advertising should be permitted within a designated distance of school zones,
playgrounds and residential areas. However, allowances must be made for
advertising in commercial and industrial zones that are removed by a designated
distance from the above mentioned areas. This would be a less restrictive alternative
to a complete ban on commercial speech that would still allow the government’s
interest to be achieved.
The government must also find a way to cure the restriction that deals with
tobacco product advertising on the Internet that is accessible in the U.S. The Internet
and the law that pertains to it is currently under development. The courts are just
now beginning to become involved in the regulation of the Internet. The blanket
ban on advertising on the Internet is too broad because it restricts speech that adults
are constitutionally entitled to receive and address to each other.149 There are a
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number of less restrictive alternatives that may be constructed to more narrowly
tailor this restriction while at the same time be at least as effective in achieving the
government’s objective. The Court in Reno found that currently available user-based
software suggests that a reasonably effective method by which parents can prevent
their children from accessing material which the parents believe is inappropriate will
be widely available.150 Other possible alternatives discussed in Reno, were requiring
that indecent materials be “tagged” to facilitate parental control, making exceptions
for materials with artistic or educational value, providing some tolerance for parental
choice, and regulating some portions of the Internet differently than others.151 The
Internet restriction should also be careful to include a provision that subjects the
Internet to the no use of cartoon characters and human images restriction so the
government’s interest will not be completely undermined.152 As has been
demonstrated, the government has a number of avenues it can take in order to more
narrowly tailor the Internet restriction so that it complies with Central Hudson.
The last restriction that needs to be cured is the ban on direct and indirect
payments for tobacco images in movies, television programs and video games. This
provision can be more narrowly tailored without much difficulty. Tobacco
advertisements shall not be permitted at movies that are rated with a “G” or “PG-13",
but shall be permitted at “R” and “NC-17" movies because these movies are to be
viewed by adults or with parental discretion. This least restrictive alternatives strikes
the proper balance because it will allow the government to achieve its objective
without trampling on the commercial speech rights of adults.
This restriction should also include video tapes of movies (e.g. VCR tapes, movie
rental tapes) in its provision because children may be able to gain access to video
tapes that are rated “R” and “NC-17" that are laying around the house and be
subjected to tobacco advertisements.
This would directly undermine the
government’s substantial interest in reducing youth smoking.
It is further recommended by the author that the government keep up its fact
finding mission and continue to develop the record in order to be able to clearly
establish the link between youth smoking and tobacco advertising. It is clear that the
Supreme Court’s trend is towards concrete evidence, rather than “speculation or
conjecture” when it comes to assessment of commercial speech restrictions.153
V. CONCLUSION
This Note discusses the First Amendment implications of the marketing and
advertising restrictions contained in the Master Settlement Agreement between the
U.S. Attorneys General and the participating tobacco industry. The commercial
speech doctrine, including the path breaking decision of Central Hudson and its
progeny, is discussed to provide the framework for analysis of the Master Settlement
restrictions. Issues of constitutionality and standing were also assessed. After a
150
521 U.S. at 844. The user-based software that the Court speaks of in Reno may
currently be available, since Reno was decided on June 26, 1997. The author of this note does
not profess to have an in depth knowledge of the Internet nor the software available in its use.
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thorough evaluation of the Master Settlement provisions, this Note concludes that the
compelling nature of the government’s interest in protecting children and adolescents
from the dangers of smoking and the narrowly tailored approach that a majority of
the advertising restrictions adopt, much of the Master Settlement Agreement will
likely withstand judicial scrutiny under the applicable legal standard.154 Even the
restrictions that are constitutionally infirm at present, can be more narrowly tailored
and saved if the government follows the suggestions contained in this note. Based
on the high stakes that are involved in this Master Settlement Agreement for many
parties that did not participate in the settlement negotiations and final agreement, it is
likely that a party will seek standing to challenge the restrictions contained in the
Master Settlement Agreement. The government must continue to develop the record,
adhere to its substantial interest in reducing youth smoking, and pay close attention
to Central Hudson and its progeny in order to be prepared for the constitutional
challenges to the Master Settlement Agreement.
When the reader evaluates the Master Settlement provisions and its implications,
it is important to keep in the back of one’s mind the politics that have historically
surrounded the tobacco industry in order to more fully understand and assess the
recent developments between the tobacco industry and state governments. It is
“important not to allow the government to stifle communications aimed
predominantly at adults under the guise of protecting children.”155 “Nowhere is this
danger more serious than in attempts to regulate tobacco advertising. The asserted
justifications for such regulation of the truthful promotion of a lawful product derive
exclusively from a premise of governmental paternalism that is fundamentally
inconsistent with both the purposes served by free speech and the democratic system
of which free speech is a central element.”156 Some proponents of big tobacco
believe:
The First Amendment interests threatened by the regulation of tobacco
advertising are considerably more substantial than many have recognized. If the
government is permitted to prohibit truthful advocacy of a lawful activity because of
the fear that citizens will make unwise choices, there is no basis on which to
distinguish government’s efforts to do the same in other areas of public
decisionmaking. Bluntly put, prohibition of tobacco advertising constitutes a
governmental exercise in mind control of its citizens–hardly a course of action
consistent with the letter, spirit or tradition of the First Amendment right of free
expression.157
It has already been pointed out that the government may have some “not so
substantial” motives for settling. But, what about big tobacco? What are they really
hiding that entices them into settling for such one-sided restrictions? Clearly, the
Master Settlement Agreement is not the straw that is going to break Joe Camel’s
back (or pockets), only his image. Or will the Master Settlement Agreement even do
this?
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“Someone once said tobacco was American before America was American,
which is true. It is one of our most enduring crops. Just like Marlboro is one of our
most enduring ad campaigns. It just can’t play outside anymore?”158 Big tobacco
will find another way to continue on.
LORI ANN LUKA159
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